







Forming Stable Coalitions: 
 The Process Matters   
Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones and  
D. Marc Kilgour  













Steven J.Brams, Department of Politics, New York University, U.S.A. 
Michael A.Jones, Department of Mathematical Sciences, 
Montclair State University, U.S.A. 
D.Marc Kilgour, Department of Mathematics, 









This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
 
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index: 
http://www.feem.it/web/activ/_wp.html 
  









The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 






Players are assumed to rank each other as coalition partners. Two processes of coalition 
formation are defined and illustrated:  
•Fallback (FB):Players seek coalition partners by descending lower and lower in their 
preference rankings until some majority coalition, all of whose members consider each 
other mutually acceptable, forms. 
•Build-up (BU):Same descent as FB, except only majorities whose members rank each 
other highest form coalitions. 
BU coalitions are stable in the sense that no member would prefer to be in another 
coalition, whereas FB coalitions, whose members need not rank each other highest, may 
not be stable. BU coalitions are bimodally distributed in a random society, with peaks 
around simple majority and unanimity the distributions of majorities in the US Supreme 
Count and in the US House of Representatives follow this pattern. The dynamics of 
real-life coalition-formation processes are illustrated by two Supreme Court cases. 
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Forming Stable Coalitions:  The Process Matters
1.  Introduction
Coalitions are collections of players.  Their stability is usually defined in terms of
outcomes and the incentives coalition members have to sustain them.  In this paper, we
show that the process by which the players come together and form coalitions also may
critically affect how enduring coalitions will be.
To determine which coalitions are likely to form and be stable, we assume that
each player ranks all other players as coalition partners.  At the outset, we assume that
players report their rankings truthfully, but we reconsider this assumption later.  A
coalition of k players, or k-coalition, is stable if no member would prefer to be in another
k-coalition.
It is apparent that there is always at least one stable coalition—the grand coalition,
or n-coalition, that comprises all n players—because there is no other n-coalition.  But
below the grand coalition, what coalitions will form, and how stable they will be, is
unclear.  The coalition-formation processes we postulate clarify this question and also
enable us to distinguish two levels of stability.
To rule out strategic issues that arise because of differences in player size or
capability,
1 we assume that (i) all players are of equal weight (as in a legislature in which
each member has one vote) and (ii) winning coalitions are those with at least a simple
majority, m, of members.  While we focus on nonstrategic processes of coalition
formation, we later consider the manipulability of these processes.
Coalitions form according to two processes:4
• Fallback (FB):  Players seek coalition partners by descending lower and lower in
their preference rankings until some majority coalition, all of whose members consider
each other mutually acceptable, forms.
• Build-up (BU):  Same descent as FB, except only majorities whose members rank
each other highest form coalitions.
Both these processes are driven by players’ mutual preferences, not their evaluations of
coalitions.
2
We begin with notation and definitions in section 2.  In section 3 we show that
several FB majority coalitions with k ≥  m members may form simultaneously.  Call the
set of FB coalitions that form first (i.e., at the lowest value of k) FB1.  The analogous set,
BU1, comprises a unique coalition, which is stable.  If the preferences of the players are
single-peaked, FB1 coalitions may be disconnected, but the BU1 coalition is always
connected (in a sense to be made precise later).
BU1 contains all coalitions in FB1, which may have fewer members than BU1.
This raises the question of which majority coalition is most likely to form—smaller FB1
majority coalitions, in which some members may prefer players outside the coalition to
players inside, or the BU1 coalition, in which this cannot happen?  We call smaller FB1
majority coalitions semi-stable because at least some of their members are attracted to
outside players, whereas BU1 coalitions are stable.
                                                                                                                                                          
1 For example, two ideologically distant players might join together if it would enable them to win, but
neither would join a smaller more centrally located player if the resulting coalition were not winning.
2 In Cechlárová and Romero-Medina (2000), each player uses its preference rankings of all other players to
evaluate coalitions according to two criteria—the most-preferred, and the least-preferred, members that
they contain.  Other criteria are postulated in an agent-based simulation model in a neural-network
framework, wherein political parties seek to attract a majority of players in a spatial voting game (Iizuka,
Yamamoto, Suzuki, and Ohuchi, 2002).  Related work on coalition-formation models is discussed in
section 3.5
In section 4 we show that semi-stable FB1 coalitions are manipulable in that a
player, by announcing a false preference ranking, can induce a majority coalition that it
prefers.  By contrast, BU1 semi-stable coalitions are not manipulable:  A manipulator may
be able to induce a smaller majority coalition with a false announcement, but this
coalition will not necessarily be preferred.  The reason is that the larger BU1 coalition,
which forms when the manipulator is truthful, must contain at least one member the
manipulator prefers to some player in the smaller majority coalition—so the manipulator
will not assuredly prefer the smaller coalition.
In section 5 we investigate the properties of stable coalitions.  BU1 may be a
simple-majority coalition, the grand coalition, or any size in between.  More generally,
stable coalitions of any size between m and n – 1 may or may not exist.  Two stable
coalitions (of any size) are either disjoint, or one contains the other.  A bandwagon
strategy may enable a player to be a member of a winning coalition sooner than it would
be otherwise, but it will not necessarily be a winning coalition that it prefers.
In section 6 we show that if all player preferences are equally likely, the
probability that a randomly chosen majority coalition is stable first decreases to some
minimum between m and n – 1, then increases to 1 when the grand coalition forms,
yielding a bimodal distribution, with peaks at minimal majority and unanimity.  This
finding also holds for the distribution of first-forming majority coalitions when
preferences, whether single-peaked or not, are randomly chosen.
Empirical data on the size of US Supreme Court majorities that we present in
section 7 show the distribution to be bimodal, with most being either minimal (5-person)
or maximal (9-person) majorities.  We illustrate the formation of majorities on the Court6
with an 8-0 decision (one justice recused himself) and a 5-4 decision.  Data we present on
the size of majorities in the US House of Representatives also show the distribution to be
bimodal.
We conclude that FB and BU mirror different real-life coalition-formation
processes.  BU yields larger and less manipulable majority coalitions, compared to the
more wieldy but vulnerable coalitions of FB.  Together these models show how the
stability of outcomes is inextricably linked to the processes that generate them.
2.  Notation and Definitions
We assume that all players, named 1, 2, …, n, strictly rank each other as coalition
partners, as illustrated in Example A.
Example A.    1:   2  3  4  5     2:  1  3  4  5     3:   4  5  2  1     4:  3  2  1  5     5:   4  3  2  1.
We further assume that each player ranks itself first—that is, it most desires to be
included in any majority coalition that forms.  In Example A, player 1, after itself, most
prefers player 2 as a coalition partner, followed by players 3, 4, and 5 in that order.  A
complete listing of all players’ preferences, as illustrated in Example A, is called a
preference profile.
It is clear that if there are n players, there are [(n – 1)!]
n preference profiles.  In our
model of a random society used later, all preference profiles are assumed to be
equiprobable.
Sometimes we will assume that the players can be placed along a line—in order 1,
2, 3, …, n, from left to right—so that the preference profile is single-peaked.  That is,
each player’s preference for coalition partners declines monotonically to the left and right7
of its position in this ordering.  A preference profile that satisfies this condition is called
ordinally single-peaked (Brams, Jones, and Kilgour, 2002).  Such profiles are commonly
assumed in spatial models of candidate and party ompetition.
To express single-peakedness in another way, consider the set of players in a
coalition; call the left-most player l and the right-most player r.  The set is connected if it
is of the form {l, l + 1, …, r}:  It contains exactly the players from l to r, inclusive.  Then
a preference profile is single-peaked if and only if, for each k = 1, 2, …, n, every player’s
k most-preferred coalition partners, including itself, form a connected set.  Thus in
Example A, when k = 3, the most-preferred 3-coalitions of players 1 (123), 2 (213),
3(345), 4 (432), and 5 (543) are all connected sets.  For all other k between 1 and 5, it is
easy to see that all most-preferred k-coaltions are connected, so the preference profile of
Example A is ordinally single-peaked.
In fact, such a preference profile may or may not be geometrically realizable in the
following sense:  If n points can be positioned along a line such that a player’s preference
decreases as distance from its position increases, then the preference profile is called
cardinally single-peaked.  To see that this condition is not satisfied in Example A,
assume that player i is located at position pi on the line.  Define the distance between two
positions, pi and pj, to be dij  = |pi – pj|.  From player 3’s preference ordering, d54 < d53 <
d32, whereas from player 4’s ordering, d32  < d42  < d54.  This contradiction shows that the
preference profile of Example A is ordinally but not cardinally single-peaked.
3
3.  The Fallback and Build-Up Processes
                                                   
3 In other words, the players’ ordinal rankings are inconsistent with every possible cardinal representation
of their positions.8
The fallback (FB) process of coalition formation unfolds as follows (Brams, Jones,
and Kilgour, 2002; Brams and Kilgour, 2001):
1.  The most preferred coalition partner of each player is considered.  If two
players mutually prefer each other, and this is a majority of players, then this is the
majority coalition that forms.  The process stops, and we call this a level 1 majority
coalition because only first-choice partners are considered.
2.  If there is no level 1 majority coalition, then the next-most preferred coalition
partners of all players are also considered.  If there is a majority of players that mutually
prefer each other at this level, then this is the majority coalition (or coalitions) that forms.
The process stops, and we call this a level 2 majority coalition.
3.  The players successively descend to lower and lower levels in their reported
rankings until a majority coalition (or coalitions), all of whose members mutually prefer
each other, forms for the first time.  The process stops, with the set of largest majority
coalition(s)—not contained in any others at this level—designated FB1.
What does FB yield in Example A?  At level 1, observe that player 1 prefers player
2, and player 2 prefers 1, so we designate 12 as a level 1 coalition, as is coalition 34 also.
4
Descending one level, player 3 likes player 5 and player 5 likes player 3, yielding 35 as a
coalition at level 2.  Descending one more level, majority coalitions 124 and 234 form for
the first time:  Each player in these coalitions finds the other two players acceptable at
level 3.  In summary, we have the following coalitions at each level:
Level 1:  12, 34                 Level 2:  35                 Level 3:  124, 234.9
Notice that coalitions are listed at the level at which they form, except that subcoalitions
are never listed.  Thus at level 3, pairs 14, 23, and 24 form but do not appear in our
listing, because they are proper subsets of coalitions 124 or 234.
Since coalitions 124 and 234 are the first majority coalitions to form, the process
stops, rendering FB1 = {124, 234}.  Observe that players 2 and 4 are common to both
coalitions; player 2 prefers coalition 124, and player 4 prefers coalition 234.  Obviously,
players 1 and 3 prefer the coalition of which each is a member.
Despite the players’ preferences being single-peaked, one of the two FB1 coalitions
(124) is disconnected:  There is a “hole” due to the absence of player 3.  The reason that
player 3 is excluded from coalition 124 is that whereas players 1 and 2 necessarily rank
player 3 higher than player 4 (because of single-peakedness), player 3 ranks players 2 and
1 at the bottom of its preference order.  In particular, player 3 does not consider player 1
acceptable at level 3, which excludes player 3 from coalition 124.
While FB is grounded in preferences of players for each other, it could as well be
based on their preferences for different features that a policy might include.  Thus in
Example A, assume players rank five features, {a, b, c, d, e}, in the same way that they
do each other.  Then at level l player 1 would find feature a acceptable, and at level 2
feature b; likewise, player 2 would find both a and b acceptable at level 2.  Consequently,
at level 2 (rather than level 1) the coalition 12 would form because of the two players’
concurrence on both a and b.  In this example, the level at which coalitions form changes,
                                                                                                                                                          
4 These preferences are truthful; we will consider later the possibility that the players strategically misreport
their preferences.10
but not their membership, as players switch from ranking each other to ranking policy
features.
5
The build-up (BU) process of coalition formation is the same as FB, with one
major difference.  As players descend to lower and lower levels, coalitions form if and
only if two or more players consider each other mutually desirable and consider players
not in the coalition less desirable.  In other words, all players in a BU coalition rank each
other—and no players outside the coalition—highest.  In Example A, this yields the
following coalitions at each level:
6
Level 1:  12, 34                 Level 4:  12345.
At levels 2 and 3, no new BU coalitions form after coalitions 12 and 34 form at level 1.
Only at level 4 does the first majority coalition appear; it is the grand coalition, so BU1 =
{12345}, or just 12345.  Note that no member would prefer to be in another 5-
coalition—there is none!—proving that this majority coalition is not only stable but
uniquely so.
Compare this outcome with that produced by FB, which gave FB1 coalitions 124
and 234 at level 3.  These coalitions are semi-stable:  Even though all their members
consider each other acceptable at level 3, some members of each coalition consider some
excluded players more desirable as coalition partners.  For coalition 124, players 1 and 2
prefer excluded player 3 to included player 4; for coalition 234, player 2 prefers excluded
                                                   
5 The number of policy features need not match the number of players.  If there are more features than
players, coalitions will form later than if there are fewer features than players.  For examples, see Brams
and Kilgour (2001).
6 In Brams, Jones, and Kilgour (2002), a different BU model is proposed in a cardinal-utility context.
Coalition members fuse into a single player whose position is the average of its members when preferences
are defined by points on the real line.11
player 1 to included players 3 and 4, and player 3 prefers excluded player 5 to included
player 2.
7
Proposition 1.  BU1  contains a unique stable coalition.  If FB1  forms at the same
level as BU1, FB1 = BU1.  Otherwise, FB1  forms at a lower level, in which case all FB1
coalitions are semi-stable and proper subsets of the BU1 coalition.
Proof.  Because the grand coalition is a BU coalition, BU1 is well-defined and
never empty.  Suppose it contains two majority coalitions.  Because both are of the same
size, say k, they must contain at least one common member i.
8  Because the other
members of both coalitions must be exactly i’s k most-preferred coalition partners, the
two coalitions in BU1 must be identical.  Hence, BU1 contains a unique coalition, which
we henceforth call BU1.  Moreover, because all members of BU1 rank each other highest,
BU1 is stable.
Every BU coalition is an FB coalition since the process of descent is the same.  If
the level of FB1 is the same as the level of BU1, then BU1 belongs to FB1.  Because there
cannot be any other coalition in FB1, then FB1 = BU1.
Now suppose that the level at which BU1 forms is k, and the level at which FB1
forms is j < k.  Consider any coalition C in FB1.  While the members of C consider each
other acceptable at some level, there is at least one player in C that prefers some player
not in C.  (If this were not the case, then C would be BU1, and j would equal k.)  This
makes C semi-stable.  Moreover, because both C and BU1 are majority coalitions, they
                                                   
7 The exclusion of preferred players from a coalition, and its manipulability (section 4), are two indicators
of its instability.  While “there is only a relatively small number of results that guarantee the existence of a
‘stable’ coalition structure” (Greenberg and Weber, 1993, p. 60), even fewer models offer insight into the
step-by-step processes of coalition formation that may (or may not) contribute to stability (Brams, Jones,
and Kilgour, 2002).12
must have a member in common, say i.  But BU1 contains i and i’s k most-preferred
coalition partners, whereas C contains i and a proper subset, with j members, of i’s most-
preferred coalition partners.  Therefore, C is properly contained in BU1.  Q.E.D.
Example A illustrates Proposition 1.  Semi-stable FB1 coalitions 124 and 234 are
contained in stable BU1 coalition 12345.  There are no stable majority coalitions smaller
than this grand coalition.  Our next example illustrates that BU1 need not be the grand
coalition.
Example B.    1:   2  3  4  5     2:  3  4  1  5     3:   4  2  1  5     4:  1  2  3  5     5:   4  3  2  1.
The FB coalitions at each level are:
Level 2:  13, 23, 24                 Level 3:  1234.
Whereas no two players consider each other mutually acceptable at level 1, at level 2 two
pairs do.  At level 3, the first majority coalition forms, so FB1 = {1234}.  But this 4-
player coalition is also BU1, because all its members consider each other, and no others,
acceptable.  Thus in Example B, the FB and BU processes produce exactly the same
majority coalition, which is neither minimal nor grand.  To be sure, the grand coalition is
also stable, but it seems unlikely to form since players 1 - 4 are united in their opposition
to player 5, which they all rank last.
If FB1 ≠  BU1, smaller FB1 coalitions, which are semi-stable, form earlier in the
descent, only later to be subsumed by a larger BU1 coalition that is stable.  Thus in
                                                                                                                                                          
8 If preferences are single-peaked and this common member is unique, it must be the median player.13
Example A, semi-stable FB1 coalitions 124 and 234 are proper subsets of stable BU1
coalition 12345.
Proposition 2.  If preferences are single-peaked, at least one FB coalition of two
players must form at level 1.
Proof.  Single-peakedness requires that every player rank an adjacent player
highest.  Let C be the subset of players whose top-ranked coalition partners are players to
their right—that is, all players i for which i + 1 is first choice.  Note that 1 ∈  C (because
there is no player to the left of 1) and that n ∉  C (because there is no player on n’s right).
Let r be the right-most (highest-numbered) player in C and note that r < n.  Then r + 1
must be r’s top choice, and r must be (r + 1)’s top choice, so the coalition {r, r +1} must
form at level 1.  Q.E.D.
In Example A, two coalitions, 12 and 34, form at level 1, whereas in Example B no
coalitions form at level 1 because its preference profile is not single-peaked.
Proposition 3.  If preferences are single-peaked, then (i) FB1 coalitions may be
disconnected, but (ii) BU1 is connected.
Proof.  Example A, with disconnected FB1 coalition124, proves (i).  To prove (ii),
assume that the left-most (lowest-numbered) member of BU1 is player l, and the right-
most (highest-numbered) player is r, where l < r.  We next show that BU1 must also
contain any i satisfying l < i < r.   If the level of BU1 is k, then BU1 comprises l and l’s k
most-preferred coalition partners.  By single-peakedness, these must be players l + 1, l +
2, …, l + k.  It follows that l + k = r, and i ∈  BU1, rendering BU1 connected.  Q.E.D.14
It is worth mentioning linkages to other work on coalition-formation processes.
Grofman (1982) and Straffin and Grofman (1984) show, in a dynamic model of coalition
formation that somewhat resembles our BU model, that coalitions will always be
connected in one dimension but not necessarily in two or more dimensions.  But under
FB, as we illustrated in Example A, coalitions need not be connected, even in one
dimension, if preferences are ordinally single-peaked.
9
We now turn to the question of whether players can manipulate either the FB or
the BU processes to their advantage.  FB, as we will see, is vulnerable to manipulation,
but BU is quite robust.
4.  The Manipulability of FB and BU
Call a process  manipulable if one player, by reporting a preference ranking
different from its true preference ranking, can induce a majority coalition that it prefers.
Proposition 4.  FB is manipulable.
 Proof.  Consider the following example:
Example C.     1:   2  3  4  5      2:  3  4  1  5      3:   2 4 1 5      4:  3 5 2 1      5:   4  3  2  1.
The FB coalitions at each level are:
Level 1:  23          Level 2:  34, 45          Level 3:  123, 234          Level 4:  12345.
Now assume player 4 misrepresents its preferences as follows:
4:   3 2 5 1.
                                                   
9 For references to more recent models in this vein, and tests of these models in party-coalition formation in
parliamentary systems, see Brams, Jones, and Kilgour (2002).15
Then FB gives the following:
Level 1:  23          Level 2:  234          Level 3:  123          Level 4:  12345.
When player 4 is truthful, FB1 = {123, 234}, whereas when player 4 misrepresents its
preferences, FB1 = {234}.  Because player 4 prefers coalition 234 to coalition 123,
misrepresentation, which precludes the possibility of coalition 123, is rational, rendering
FB manipulable.
10  Q.E.D.
By comparison, misrepresentation will not be rational for player 4 if the
comparison is between the (apparent) BU1 coalition that forms with misrepresentation
and one that forms without misrepresentation.  With misrepresentation, BU1 = 234;
without misrepresentation, BU1 = 12345.  Because the larger coalition, 12345, includes
both a preferred player (5) and a non-preferred player (1) compared to player 2 in the
smaller coalition, 234, one cannot say that player 4 prefers 234 to 12345 or vice versa.
Thus, by reporting a preference ranking different from its true preference ranking, player
4 cannot induce a majority coalition that it assuredly prefers, illustrating the
nonmanipulability of BU.
11
Proposition 5.  BU is not manipulable.
                                                   
10 Thus, truthful reporting is not a Nash equilibrium under FB, given the strategies of players are to be
truthful or not in a noncooperative game (player 4 would have an incentive not to be truthful in Example
C).  As we will show next, however, a player cannot assuredly do better by misrepresenting its preferences
under BU.  Thereby when the process of coalition formation terminates affects the stability of outcomes
generated under it, underscoring our contention that “the process matters.”
11 To be sure, if there were more information about preferences—in particular, cardinal valuations of
different coalitions by each player—it would be possible to say whether player 4 prefers 234 to 12345 or
vice versa.  In the absence of such information, however, we assume that player 4 does not have an
incentive to depart from reporting its true preference that yields 12345.16
Proof.  Assume BU1 has k members.  Then a majority coalition that any member i
of BU1 prefers cannot have more than k members, because it would contain members that
i ranks lower than those in BU1 and no members that i ranks higher.
Suppose that i prefers a majority coalition with fewer members—specifically with
j members such that m ≤  j < k, where m is a simple majority.  To induce this smaller
majority coalition through misrepresentation, i would have to reduce its ranking of some
player P not in the j-coalition, and raise some player Q into the j-coalition.
The resulting j-coalition, though an apparent BU coalition, does not contain i’s j –
1 most-preferred coalition partners since it contains player Q.  Moreover, i will not
necessarily prefer the j-coalition to BU1, because although it is smaller, it does not
contain player P, which i prefers to Q.  Thus, i is not able to induce through
misrepresentation a smaller coalition that it definitely prefers.  Q.E.D.
In Example C, as we saw earlier, player 4 can induce through misrepresentation
coalition 234—by raising player 2 (Q) and lowering player 5 (P) in its reported
ordering—making it an (apparent) BU1 coalition at level 2.  But player 4 will not
necessarily prefer coalition 234, which is an FB1 coalition, to the grand coalition, 12345.
5.  Properties of Stable Coalitions
After the appearance of BU1, larger and larger BU majority coalitions may—or
may not—appear at subsequent levels of descent.  Each larger BU majority coalition
contains all smaller BU majority coalitions, as illustrated next with a cardinally single-
peaked example.
Example D.     1:   2 3 4 5 6 7         2:   1 3 4 5 6 7        3:   2 1 4 5 6 7        4:   3 2 1 5 6 717
                         5:   6 4 3 2 1 7         6:   5 4 3 2 1 7        7:   6 5 4 3 2 1.
Geometrically, we can represent the preferences of these players by placing them at
points along the real line:
1 2   3            4                           5 6                                                                          7.
Thus, for example, the members of pairs 12 and 56 are each other’s most-preferred
coalition partners, for they are closer to each other in distance to each other than to any
other players.  Because player 3 prefers players 2 and 1 to player 4, player 3 is farther
from player 4 than from player 1.  Likewise, players 5 and 6 are farther from player 7
than from player 1, because they rank player 7 last.
We list below all the FB coalitions, not contained in any others at each level,
distinguishing those that are also BU coalitions:
 Level 1:  12 (BU), 56 (BU)       Level 2:  13, 23                  Level 3:  1234 (BU)
           Level 4:   2345                          Level 5:  123456 (BU)       Level 6:  1234567 (BU).
Observe that the first FB majority coalition to appear, 1234 at level 3, is also a BU
majority coalition, so FB1 = BU1 = 1234.  As the descent continues, there is no BU
coalition at level 4, but at level 5 a 6-member BU coalition forms.  Finally, the grand
coalition, which is always a BU coalition, appears at level 6.
Given a cardinally single-peaked preference profile, define the spread of a
coalition to be the distance between its extreme players.  Thus, the spread of coalition
1234 is the distance between player 1 on the left and player 4 on the right, or d14.  That
this distance is less than d45 ensures that coalition 1234 forms before player 5 is brought18
into the fold.  But because player 5 ranks player 6 above all other players, player 5 does
not find player 1 acceptable at level 4—only players 2, 3, 4, and 6 are acceptable at this
level.
Hence, coalition 12345 is not a BU coalition.  On the other hand, because the
spread of coalition 123456 is less than the distance between player 6 and player 7,
coalition 123456 is a BU coalition at level 5, as is the grand coalition, 1234567, at level
6.
If players’ preferences are cardinally single-peaked, it is easy to discern the stable
coalitions that form from the players’ positions and distances between them.
Proposition 6.  If preferences are cardinally single-peaked, then a subset of
players is a BU coalition if and only if it is connected and its spread is less than the
distances from each extreme member (other than 1 and n) to the nearest player not in the
subset.
Proof.  Suppose that the connected subset C = {l, l + 1, …, r} has the properties
that either l = 1 or dl(l-1) > drl  and either r = n or d(r+1)r > drl.  Clearly, the remaining
members of C are l’s top choices as coalition partners, and similarly for r.  Also, if i ∈  C,
j ∈  C, and k ∉  C, then dij < drl < min{dik, drk}, which shows that the remaining members
of C are also i’s top choices as coalition partners, making C a BU coalition.  The
converse is obvious.  Q.E.D.
Put more informally, a coalition that is disconnected cannot be a BU coalition,
because members would rank the left-out member higher than some members of the
coalition.  Now assume a coalition is connected but that the distance of an extreme19
member to an adjacent non-member—either on the left or on the right—is less than the
spread.  Then the adjacent non-member will be ranked higher by the extreme member
than some player in the coalition, so the coalition cannot be a BU coalition.
Proposition 6 provides a characterization of BU coalitions if the players have
cardinally single-peaked preferences, thereby enabling one to “read” the BU coalitions
from the geometric representation.  In general, members of a BU coalition must be
sufficiently isolated from players outside it to rank only each other tops.
Whether players’ preferences are cardinally single-peaked or not, it is always
possible to ensure the existence—or nonexistence—of BU majority coalitions at any
level from m – 1 (simple majority coalition) to n – 1 (grand coalition).   
Proposition 7.   BU majority coalitions may appear—or not appear—at any level,
up to the appearance of the grand coalition.
Proof.  See Appendix.
In the proof of Proposition 7, we show that, with one exception, it is possible to
construct a cardinally single-peaked preference profile whose majority BU coalitions are
of any size, or combination of sizes.  The exception occurs when n = 3; in this case,
ordinally and cardinally single-peaked preferences are identical and produce a BU1
coalition of size 2.  When preferences are not single-peaked, BU1 is of size 3.  We will
describe this case in detail in section 6.
The algorithm used to prove Proposition 7 yields, in the case of Example D, the
following positions pi of players i:
 i:        1          2          3          4          5          6          720
pi:        0          1          3          7         16      16.5      34
These positions are approximated by the representation given on the real line earlier.
Our construction in the proof of Proposition 7 is a quantitative one that yields the
stable majority coalitions (1234, 123456, and 1234567) in this example.  But we
emphasize that it is the ordinal rankings that determine the stability of coalitions.  Thus,
BU1 = 1234 in Example D, because players 1 - 4 all rank each other highest.  There is no
5-member BU coalition, because player 5 does not rank players 1 - 4 in its top four places
(it ranks player 1 lower, and player 6 higher, than 4
th place).  There is next a 6-member
BU coalition, 123456, because players 1 - 6 rank each other highest.  The grand coalition,
1234567, as always, is a BU coalition.
Notice that less-than-majority FB coalitions, but not BU coalitions, form at levels
2 and 4 in Example D.  The two 2-member coalitions at level 2 become part of BU
coalition 1234 at level 3, and the 4-member FB majority coalition, 2345, at level 4
becomes part of BU majority coalition 123456 at level 5.
The level 1 BU coalition 56 remains apart until level 5.  Although player 5 is
acceptable to players 1 - 4 at level 4, player 5 does not find player 1 acceptable at this
level.  Consequently, player 5 does not get absorbed into a majority coalition until the
descent reaches level 5, when player 6—player 5’s most-preferred coalition partner—also
gets absorbed.
Example D illustrates that a less-than-majority BU coalition (56) and a majority
BU coalition (1234) can co-exist.  However, two different BU majority coalitions, which
of necessity overlap, cannot co-exist, as is possible under FB (see Example A for an
illustration).21
Proposition 8.  If two BU coalitions intersect, then one contains the other.
Proof.  Suppose that two BU coalitions—one with j members and the other with k
≥  j members—have a member i in common.  The members of the j-coalition must be
player i and the first j – 1 players in i’s preference ranking.  The members of the k-
coalition must be player i and the first k – 1 players in i’s preference ranking.  Clearly, the
k-coalition contains the j-coalition.  Q.E.D.
A consequence of Proposition 8 is that any majority BU coalition of a specific size
is unique.  In particular, BU1 contains only a single coalition, as already noted in
Proposition 1.  In Example D, the BU coalitions that form at levels 1 and 3 are contained
in the level 5 BU coalition, which in turn is contained in the level 6 BU coalition.  But
BU coalition 56, which forms at level 1, is disjoint from BU majority coalition 1234 that
forms at level 3.  In general, if BU coalitions co-exist, then at most one is of majority
size.
In section 4, we showed that members of BU1 cannot, in general, induce a
preferred majority coalition, although they might be able to speed up the formation of an
apparent (smaller) BU1 coalition.  But what if a non-member of BU1 desires to be part of
a BU coalition?  We next show that such a player can conceivably benefit from a
bandwagon strategy, which enables it, by misrepresenting its preferences, to be part of a
larger BU majority coalition sooner than it would be if it were truthful.
To illustrate, suppose that player 5 in Example D reports its preference ranking to
be
5:   4 3 2 1 6 7.22
At level 5, BU majority coalition 12345 will form, which includes player 5.  By
comparison, if player 5 were truthful, the next BU majority coalition to form—after BU1
= 1234—would be 123456.  Because player 6 is player 5’s most-preferred coalition
partner, player 5 does not necessarily benefit from a bandwagon strategy, even though
this strategy puts it into a smaller BU majority coalition at level 4 rather than level 5.
If there is a benefit, it would come by misrepresenting one’s preferences in order to
join the winning coalition early (i.e., “jumping on the bandwagon”).  Indeed, there is
evidence from US national party conventions of delegates’ shifting to the expected
winner—allegedly to demonstrate party unity—as soon as the handwriting of victory is
on the wall.  Such proclamations of support may well be motivated by cold-blooded
calculations of the direct benefit (e.g., a government appointment) that sometimes accrues
to former opponents (Brams, 1978).
6.  The Probability of Stable Coalitions
Because BU coalitions may or may not exist at every level from simple majority to
grand, it is useful to ask when they are most likely to form.  To illustrate in a simple case,
assume there are three players.  Then each player can rank the two others in two ways.
For example, player 1 can rank players 2 and 3 as follows:
(i)   1:   2 3                    (ii)  1:  3 2.
Suppose (i) obtains.  If player 2 has the following ranking,
2:  1 3,23
BU1 = 12, whatever the ranking of player 3 (2 cases).  Suppose (ii) obtains.  If player 3
has the following ranking,
3:  1 2,
BU1 = 13, whatever the ranking of player 2 (2 cases).  Whether the preferences of player
1 are (i) or (ii) (2 cases), BU1 = 23 if
2:  3 1
3:  2 1.
Altogether, there are 6 cases in which a 2-member BU coalition forms.
By comparison, there are 2 cases in which BU1 = 123:
12
1:  2 3                    1:  3 2
2:  3 1                    2:  1 3
3:  1 2                    3:  2 1.
If the 2
3 = 8 cases are equally likely, the probability that there is a 2-member stable
coalition is 6/8 = 3/4.  On the other hand, because the grand coalition is always stable, the
probability that there is a 3-member stable coalition is 1.
We next generalize this result by finding a formula, P(n, k), for the probability that
a k-coalition (k ≥  m)  is stable if all strict preference rankings of n players are equally
likely, which we call a random society.  The following proposition describes the behavior
of this probability as the size of a majority coalition increases from m to n.
                                                   
12 The preferences of players in these two cases lead to a Condorcet voting paradox, or cyclical majorities.24
Proposition 9.  The probability of a BU coalition, starting at k = m, decreases to a
minimum at some intermediate value of k before increasing to 1 at k = n.  More precisely,
for each n ≥  3, there exists an integer k0(n) = k0, satisfying m ≤  k0 < n, such that P(n, k +
1) < P(n, k) if m ≤  k < k0, P(n, k0 + 1) ≥  P(n, k0), and P(n, k + 1) > P(n, k) if k > k0.
Moreover, k0(n) > m whenever n ≥  5.
Proof.  See Appendix.
For small values of n and k, we have calculated not only P(n, k) but also Q(n, k),
the probability that a k-coalition (k ≥  m) is stable when all preference rankings of the n
players are ordinally single-peaked and equally likely to occur.  In addition, using the
method of inclusion-exclusion (Brualdi, 1999, pp. 159-168), we have made analogous
calculations of the probabilities, P1(n, k) and Q1(n, k), that stable majority coalitions form
for the first time—that is, form at size k but not earlier.  All these probabilities are given
in Table 1 for values of n between 3 and 9, and all values of k between m and n.
________________________________________________________________________
Table 1 about here
________________________________________________________________________
In the 3-player case we just described, P(3, 2) = 0.75 and P(3, 3) = 1, as we
showed.  When preferences are restricted to those that are ordinally single-peaked, Q(3,
2) = Q(3, 3) = 1, because there are no instances in which BU1 coalitions do not form at
level 1.
The probabilities of BU1 coalitions appearing for the first time are P1(3, 2) = 0.75
and P1(3, 3) = 0.25, because 2 of the 8 preference profiles yield BU1 coalitions when k =25
3.  But when preferences are ordinally single-peaked, Q1(3, 2) = 1 and Q1(3, 3) = 0,
because all 6 preference profiles yield BU1 coalitions when k = 2.
Now consider the P values in the Table 1A.  For fixed n, these probabilities are
virtually identical when n = 7 and n = 9.  They first decrease going from k = m to some
intermediate value of k, and then increase to almost 1 in the case of P1(n, k), and to 1 in
the case of P(n, k).
What Proposition 9 does not indicate, though the numerical values of both P(n, k)
and P1(n, k) do, is that even when k = m, these probabilities are very small compared with
their values when k = n.  In other words, almost all BU1 coalitions in a random society
form—in fact, form for the first time—only when the grand coalition appears.
It is evident that the probability that any BU majority coalition (except the grand
coalition) forms in a random society becomes vanishingly small as n increases.  This
reflects the fact that there is at most one BU coalition at each majority size, and that
stability is a certainty only for the grand coalition.
While the probability values in Table 1 may not be empirically accurate, the
distributions may be qualitatively correct in many situations.  As we will see later,
majority coalitions in real-life voting bodies often do cluster around simple majority and
grand—that is, their distribution is V-shaped between k = m and k = n, as the BU model
predicts.
To be sure, the bimodal distribution of the probability values for general
preferences concentrates almost all the support on the grand coalition.  This support is
dampened somewhat if preferences are restricted to profiles that are ordinally single-
peaked (see the Q values in Table 1B).  When n = 5, for example, Q1(5, 3) = 0.333 and26
Q1(5, 4) = 0.104, compared with P1(5, 3) = 0.046 and P1(5, 4) = 0.016.  Thus, in the
former case there is a 44% chance that BU1 will not be the grand coalition, whereas in the
latter case there is only a 6% chance.
Of course, coalition formation does not generally occur in a random society.
Subsets of players, such as political parties in a national legislature, will have members
with similar preferences.  In such situations, we would expect less-than-grand coalitions
to form more frequently and be stable.
We conjecture that the distribution of FB1 semi-stable majority coalitions in a
random society, for which we have not yet made detailed calculations, is also V-shaped,
whether preferences are general or ordinally single-peaked.  But instead of the V’s being
so heavily weighted on the side of the grand coalition—that the V looks more like a
J—our preliminary calculations indicate that the FB1 distribution will be considerably
flattened, so there will be more weight in the middle as well as around a simple majority.
In the next section, we present empirical data on the distribution of majorities in
the Supreme Court and illustrate coalition formation on the Court with two cases.   In
addition, we present data on the distribution of majorities in the House of
Representatives, showing that, like the Court, the distribution is bimodal.
7.  The Formation of Majorities on the Supreme Court
In the 9-person US Supreme Court, majority coalitions fit the bimodal probability
distribution we found under BU, with majorities tending to be either minimal winning or27
unanimous.  Between 1962 and 1997, we have the following distribution, with the
minimum occurring at majority size 7:
13
Majority size:                   5              6            7            8            9
Percent of cases:             24            21          13          14          27
These statistics, however, do not elucidate the process by which justices actually
coalesce, either in divided 5-4 majorities and in consensual 9-0 decisions.  For this
purpose we consider two examples, one in which the Court was unanimous and the other
in which it was sharply divided.
We start with the unanimous decision, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974),
the infamous White House tapes case, which was actually decided by an 8-0 vote.
14
Before this case reached the Court, it looked like it would be contentious, based on an
unofficial poll by Justice William Brennan.  The four Nixon appointees favored the
president’s claim of executive privilege on withholding the White House tapes, and four
took the other side, with Justice Byron White, who usually kept his counsel, inscrutable
(Woodward and Armstrong, 1979, p. 289).  Because the decision in this case triggered an
unprecedented event—the resignation of a president—Schwartz (1996, p. 145) views it as
“the most spectacular case decided by the Burger Court.”
In the Court’s deliberations, Chief Justice Warren Burger, a Nixon appointee,
initially sided with the president on executive privilege but was opposed by the rest of the
Court.  Acting as a kind of rump committee, the other justices redrafted Burger’s original
                                                   
13 These data are drawn from Edelman and Sherry (2000), who also note the bimodal character of the
Supreme Court majority decisions. They explain it in terms of a Markov process of coalition formation,
using the Supreme Court voting data to calculate the probability of different absorbing states.  By contrast,
our work suggests a V-shaped distribution on theoretical grounds, independent of any data.28
opinion, with different twosomes and threesomes rewriting its seven parts (Schwartz,
1996, p. 147).  While Nixon was not the only such case of “decision by committee”
during the Burger reign—another exception was Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), an
important campaign-finance case (Schwartz, 1996, pp. 143-144)—Nixon is particularly
insightful on how the build-up toward a final consensus was achieved.
The analysis of Nixon that follows does not do justice to Woodward and
Armstrong’s (1979) 63-page blow-by-blow account, or even Schwartz’s (1996) 4-page
insider account that includes a page from the personal files of one justice.  Although the
justices agreed that executive privilege was neither absolute nor unreviewable (especially
in camera), they differed on how much confidentiality should be accorded presidential
conversations and papers.
Because of the paramount importance and extreme public interest in the case, most
justices believed that the decision should be the strongest possible—in particular, one
delivered as a joint opinion, not written by a particular justice.
15  But Chief Justice Burger
refused to go along, saying, “The responsibility is on my shoulders.”  Schwartz (1996,
pp. 145-146) summarizes the situation that then developed:
                                                                                                                                                          
14 Justice William Rehnquist recused himself because of his earlier service in the Nixon administration.
15 It was not just a matter of writing a strong opinion; the justices were also extremely concerned that
President Nixon would not abide by their decision unless it was “definitive,” a term used but never defined
by Nixon that was widely interpreted to mean unanimous.  Brams (1978, ch. 5) argues that Nixon’s implicit
threat set up a game between Nixon and his two appointees, Burger and Harry Blackmun, who had to
decide whether to make the decision unanimous by siding with the 6-person majority; Nixon, in turn, had to
decide whether to comply with the decision or not.  Rational strategies in the game are for Burger and
Blackmun to side with the majority, and for Nixon to comply, which is, of course, what happened and
forced Nixon’s resignation 17 days later.  But treating Burger and Blackmun as a single player belies newer
evidence, cited here, indicating that Burger alone was the only significant holdout.  For a more informal
treatment of strategizing on the Supreme Court that includes a statistical analysis of cases, see Maltzman,
Spriggs, and Wahlbeck (2000).29
He [Burger] would prepare the opinion and would circulate its different parts as he
finished them.  But the drafts he sent around took a more expansive view of
presidential power than the others were willing to accept.  The Justices refused to
go along and virtually wrested the opinion-drafting process from the Chief Justice
in order to secure an opinion that they could join.
In granting certiorari under a provision that allowed for expedited review of cases
“of imperative public importance,” five—rather than the usual four—justices needed to
agree to review the case.  Justice William Brennan took the lead in putting together the
votes, making the following calculation (Woodward and Armstrong, p. 290):
He could count on [William] Douglas and [Thurgood] Marshall.  Douglas was
eager to come to grips with his long-time antagonist…. They might well be joined
by [Potter] Stewart…. [Byron] White could be within reach.  Burger was beyond
hope…. Blackmun was a possible cert vote…. It was difficult to tell where [Lewis]
Powell stood.
In the end, the expedited certiorari decision received six votes.
Brennan and Douglas, the core of the coalition against Nixon, worried that the
other justices might resent their doing most of the writing if Burger did not go along.
Marshall signed on next, and Stewart seemed receptive.  But even at the start of
deliberations, Brennan found Douglas’s draft opinion “rais[ed] issues that were likely to
derail consensus” that “did not need to be addressed” (Woodward and Armstrong, 1979,
p. 297).30
Subsequently, these drafts were modified, but Powell and Stewart still had
misgivings, not wanting to put the functionings of government “into a goldfish bowl,”
exposed to all and undermining the principle of confidentiality.  Blackmun had another
misgiving, fretting that if the Court reached a consensus against the president, Burger
might assign the case to himself.  This would raise serious questions about his
impartiality if the president were impeached and, subsequently, there was trial in the
Senate, over which he as chief justice would preside (Woodward and Armstrong, 1979,
pp. 298, 301).
In the end, a liberal coalition comprising Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall, and a
moderate coalition comprising Blackmun, Powell, and White, formed, with Stewart the
linchpin that brought the two sides together.
16  He was assisted by Brennan, the greatest
consensus builder then sitting on the Court.
It is reasonable to suppose that each of the 3-member coalition members ranked
Stewart fourth, followed by members of the other coalition, with Burger, who held out
until the end, ranked last by all the other justices.  Under FB, the first majority coalition
of five or more members to form would comprise Stewart and either the liberal coalition
and one or more conservatives, or the conservative coalition and one or more liberals.
The first BU coalition to form would then include all justices except Burger.
Once the other seven justices had reached agreement, however, the pressure was on
Burger, who felt that the others had been “merciless” and that he had been “sandbagged”
(Woodward and Armstrong, 1979, pp. 340-341).  Ultimately he acquiesced, not wanting
                                                   
16 Stearns (2000, p. 236) classifies Blackmun as liberal, though he almost always voted with Burger, whom
he classifies as conservative.  In fact, Burger and Blackmun had the highest agreement level of any pair of
justices in the 1970-74 period (83.5 percent), which is why they were called the “Minnesota twins.”31
to be a minority of one—but not without claiming authorship of the “committee”
decision, which he made his own.
17
We now turn to the 5-4 case (Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).  The
Supreme Court has considered many obscenity cases over the past 40 years, and almost
all its decisions have been divided and contentious.  Instead of examining the build-up of
coalitions on any single case, we jump to the final stage of this decision.  With the Court
deadlocked 4-4, it turned to Blackmun to cast the fifth and decisive vote:  Between the
two protagonists, “he [Blackmun] could make his new friend Brennan or his old friend
the Chief [Burger] author of the majority opinion” (Woodward and Armstrong, 1979, p.
252).
Blackmun worried that Burger’s broad definition of obscenity could lead to the
banning of much worthwhile literature.  When Blackmun threatened not to support
Burger, Burger reluctantly agreed to incorporate a more limited definition of obscenity
into his opinion.  Blackmun then became Burger’s fifth vote; subsequently, Brennan
revised his opinion as a dissent (Woodward and Armstrong, 1979, p. 252).
In effect, Blackmun ranked Burger coalition members above Brennan coalition
members, and they him, making this 5-member coalition both an FB and a BU majority
coalition.  But, of course, it did not become a winning coalition until Burger made a
concession, illustrating that the rankings presumed in the FB and BU models may not be
set in stone.
                                                   
17 And how might this decision be described?  “It was now virtually impossible to trace the turns and twists
the opinion had taken:  ideas articulated by Douglas and Powell, modified by Brennan, quickly sketched by
the Chief [Burger]; a section substituted by White; a footnote dropped for Marshall; Blackmun’s facts
embroidered over the Chief’s; Stewart’s constant tinkering and his ultimatum” (Woodward and Armstrong,
1979, p. 344).32
In fact, players change their minds, sometimes because of a change of heart and
sometimes for strategic reasons (Burger in the two cases considered here).  As an
example of a more sincere switch, Brennan renounced all definitions of obscenity after
the 1972 case, allying himself with Douglas’s more liberal view and ending their 16 years
of disagreement on this issue (Woodward and Armstrong, 1979, p. 253).
There are other voting bodies in which our models seem applicable, including the
U.S. House of Representatives.  Indeed, as in the Supreme Court, there is a bimodal
distribution of majority sizes, based on the 12,688 roll call votes between 1955 through
1990:
18
Percent majority:          50–60     60-70     70-80     80-90     90-100
Percent of roll calls:        26           19          14           11           30
Although the minimum occurs in the 80-90 percent range, not the middle 70-80 percent
range, the two modes are the near-majority and near-unanimity ranges, consistent with
the BU model.
In the final section we will assess the stability of the grand and smaller majority
coalitions in light of both the FB and BU models.  We will also suggest some empirical
observations and data that might be useful in further testing the model.
8.  Conclusions
BU seems most applicable to studying coalition formation in multimember courts
and legislatures, in which small subsets of members coalesce and build up to a majority,
all of whose members rank each other highest and are therefore stable.  FB probably33
better describes the formation of a governing coalition in parliamentary democracies,
wherein disconnected coalitions sometimes form.  Because parties in such coalitions rank
some parties outside the coalition higher than parties in it, these coalitions are at best
semi-stable.
19
Insofar as voters’ preferences are single-peaked, the coalition governments that
form are usually connected.  Indeed, they are often described by such terms as “left-
center” or “center-right.”  On occasion, however, the left and right do get together and
form national-unity governments—sometimes in response to a crisis, like the threat of
war—in which many members may be far from each other’s favorite coalition partners.
Such semi-stable coalitions, which may be disconnected, tend not to last.
According to Riker’s (1962) size principle, some of their members grow disaffected and
leave if there are insufficient resources to reward them in an oversized coalition.
Through manipulation, players can disrupt semi-stable coalitions by announcing
false preferences.  Not all these changes, however, may be purely opportunistic.  For
example, Jim Jeffords, a US Senator from Vermont, switched from the Republican party
to become an independent in 2001, turning the Democratic party into the majority party
in the Senate.  He seems to have been motivated by a genuine belief that he could better
serve Vermont and his country by changing his party affiliation.  By contrast, we
suggested that the preference changes that create bandwagons may not be so sincere.
To conclude, coalition-formation processes affect the size and stability of the
coalitions they generate.  If stability can be measured by durability, then our models may
                                                                                                                                                          
18 We are grateful to Jeffrey E. Cohen for calling our attention to these data, which were compiled by David
W. Rohde for the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research in January 1995.34
provide insight into why parliamentary coalitions in a country like Italy are less durable
than those in the Scandinavian countries, where government coalitions sometimes do not
include even a simple majority of members.
The models might also enhance our understanding of the stability of coalitions in
other arenas, including international relations.  Some international alliances like NATO
have been long-lasting, others ephemeral.  Is the process that led to the former more BU-
like, the latter more FB-like?  Our models, we believe, provide tools for investigating
such questions.
                                                                                                                                                          
19 Because the significant players in parliamentary democracies are different-size parties, strategic
considerations come into play that the FB and BU do not take account of (see note 1).  Data on coalition
governments in Western Europe can be found in Müller and Strom (2000).35
Appendix
Proposition 7.   BU majority coalitions may appear—or not appear—at any level,
up to the appearance of the grand coalition.
Proof.  Assume that there are n > 3 players and that m =  (n + 1)/2 .  The
following algorithm positions player i at xi on the real line.  Players’ preferences are then
defined by Euclidean distance—that is, player i prefers player j over player k if the
distance between xi and xj is less than the distance between xj and xk.  The following
algorithm constructs cardinally single-peaked preferences in which the only stable
majority coalitions are of size kh, h = 1, 2, …, t, where m ≤  k1 < k2 … < kt = n.  Note that t
≥  1.
Assign x1 = 0.  For 1 < i ≤  m, let player i’s position be defined recursively by xi =
2xi-1 + 1.  By construction, for 1 < i < m, player i’s single-peaked preferences are
i:  i – 1   i – 2  …   2   1   i + 1   i + 2 … m – 1   m   m + 1 … n.
Notice that player i most prefers player i – 1 as a coalition partner.
The construction considers two separate cases.  First suppose t = 1 (i.e., only the
grand coalition is stable and k1 = n.)  Let xm+1 = xm + 1/2 and define xi for i  > m + 1 by
xm+k+1 = xm+k + xm-k+1 – xm-k.  Since the distance between xm+k+1 and xm+k  is the same as the
distance between xm-k+1 and xm-k, it follows that, for m + 1 < j < n, player j most prefers
player j + 1.
Player m has the following preferences, depending on whether n is odd or even,
respectively,
m:  m + 1   m – 1   m + 2   m – 2 …  m + k   m – k … n   1; or36
m:  m + 1   m – 1   m + 2   m – 2 …  m + k   m – k … n   2   1.
Because preferences are single-peaked, any k-stable coalition for k ≥  m must contain the
median voter(s).  Hence, we can focus on player m’s preferences.
Any k-stable majority coalition must comprise the first k – 1 players in player m’s
ranking.  If k – 1 = 2l, then player m ranks player m – l in position k – 1 of its ranking.  So
a k-stable coalition must contain players m and m – l.  But, player m – l most prefers
player m – l – 1.  Since player m does not rank player m – l – 1 among its k – 1 most-
preferred coalition partners (because player m – l is the least-preferred player in the
coalition), the coalition is not k-stable.  Similarly, if k – 1 = 2l – 1, then player m ranks
player m + l in position k – 1 of its ranking.
A k-stable coalition must contain players m and m + l.  But, player m + l most
prefers player m + l + 1 as a coalition partner, which is not among player m’s top k – 1
players.  And no majority coalition of size k < n is stable.
Now suppose t > 1, so k1 < n.  For m ≤  i < k1 < n, let j satisfy i = m + j.  Then
player i’s position is given by xi = xm for j = 0 and xi = xi-1 +  j 2
1
for j ≥  1.  Similarly, for k1
< i ≤  k2, let j satisfy i = k1 + j.  Define xi = 2xm + 2 for j = 1 and xi = xi-1 +  1 2
1
− j for j > 1.
Finally, for ks-1 < i ≤  ks ≤  n, let j satisfy i = ks-1 + j.  Player i’s position is given by xi = 2xs-1
+ 2 for j = 1 and xi = xi-1 +  1 2
1
− j for j > 1.
It is possible to describe player i’s preferences for i ≥  m, too.  If ks-1 < i ≤  ks where
j satisfies i = ks-1 + j, then player i’s ranking of coalition partners is37
i:  i + 1   i + 2 …  ks   i – 1   i – 2 … 2   1   ks  + 1   ks + 2 … n.
Any majority stable coalition that contains player i must contain a player j where 1
< j < m.  But, by construction, player j most prefers player j – 1.  This implies that all of
the players less than i must be in the coalition.  Since player i’s most-preferred coalition
partners are players i + 1, i + 2, i + 3, … , and ks, only coalitions of the form {1, 2, …  , ks}
are stable.  The same argument holds for i where m ≤  i ≤  kh as well.  Q.E.D.
Proposition 9.  The probability of a BU coalition, starting at k = m, decreases to a
minimum at some intermediate value of k before increasing to 1 at k = n.  More precisely,
for each n ≥  3, there exists an integer k0(n) = k0, satisfying m ≤  k0 < n, such that P(n, k +
1) < P(n, k) if m ≤  k < k0, P(n, k0 + 1) ≥  P(n, k0), and P(n, k + 1) > P(n, k) if k > k0.
Moreover, k0(n) > m whenever n ≥  5.
Proof.  Because each player can rank all other players in (n – 1)! ways, there are a
total of [(n – 1)!]
n preference profiles.  Suppose a k-coalition is stable, where 2 ≤  k ≤  n.
Then for each member of the coalition, the first k – 1 players in its preference ranking
must be the other members of the coalition.  It follows that the number of preference
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  ways to choose the members of the stable
k-coalition.  For each of the k members of this coalition, the other members (which come
highest in its preference ranking) can be arranged in (k – 1)! ways; for each of the non-38
members of the coalition, which come lower in its preference ranking, can be arranged in
(n – k)! ways.   Finally, there are (n – 1)! ways to choose the preference rankings of each
of the n – k non-members of the coalition.
Formula (1) is not very useful for small values of k, because it double-counts
instances when there are two or more disjoint stable coalitions with k members.  But for
m ≤  k ≤  n, formula (1) gives the number of preference rankings, out of [(n – 1)!]
n, in
which a (unique) stable majority coalition exists (see Proposition 8).
It follows from the preceding argument that in a random society with n players, the
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By construction, 0 < P(n, k) ≤  1.  Also, it is easy to check that P(n, n) = 1.
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Moreover, P(n, k + 1) > P(n, k) if and only if strict inequality holds in (4).
Now suppose that k satisfies m ≤  k < n and that P(n, k + 1) ≥  P(n, k).  Therefore (4)
holds.  We show that P(n, k + 2) > P(n, k + 1) by showing that strict inequality holds on
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.        (6)
To verify the inequality of (6), note that it is equivalent to
2k
2 – (n – 4)k – (2n – 1) > 0,
which is easily shown to be true because k > n/2.
It is not difficult to show that when n ≥  5 and k = m, the right side of (4) is
approximately equal to e
3/2 = 4.48.  Therefore, k0, the minimum value of k for which (4)
holds, exceeds m if and only if n ≥  5.  Q.E.D.41
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Probabilities of Stable (BU) Coalitions (P, Q) and
First-Forming Stable (BU1) Coalitions (P1, Q1)
A.  All preference profiles equiprobable





P(5,k) 0.0463 0.0195 1
P1(5,k) 0.0463 0.0166 0.9371
P(7,k) 2.19 x 10
-4 2.77 x 10
-5 1.50 x 10
-4 1
P1(7,k) 2.19 x 10
-4 2.76 x 10
-5 1.50 x 10
-4 0.9996
P(9,k) 7.50 x 10
-8 2.72 x 10
-9 2.67 x 10
-9 5.36 x 10
-7 1
P1(9,k) 7.50 x 10
-8 2.72 x 10
-9 2.67 x 10
-9 5.36 x 10
-7 0.999999
B.  All ordinally single-peaked preference profiles equiprobable





Q(5,k) 0.3333 0.1875 1
Q1(5,k) 0.3333 0.1042 0.5625
Q(7,k) 0.0640 0.0640 0.0308 1
Q1(7,k) 0.0640 0.0591 0.0272 0.8497
Q(9,k) 8.55 x 10
-3 2.75 x 10
-3 2.12 x 10
-3 4.81 x 10
-3 1
Q1(9,k) 8.55 x 10
-3 2.54 x 10
-3 2.01 x 10
-3 4.65 x 10
-3 0.9822 
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